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Abstract 
 
This paper examines UK University Vice Chancellors (VC) pay awards.  The empirical analysis, 
covering the period 1997 to 2002, evaluates the impact upon VC pay awards of university 
performance measures, an internal pay comparison measure and two external pay comparisons, 
i.e., the pay of other VCs and the pay of CEOs leading comparable-sized UK firms. We find no 
evidence that VC pay awards are related to any of the performance measures, though the positive 
relationship found between changes in the proportion of other highly-paid employees and VC pay 
awards suggests that internal pay comparisons play an important role in remuneration committee 
decision making. Of the two external pay benchmarks, the pay received by other VCs has the 
largest positive impact upon VC pay awards.  Nevertheless, the (much smaller) partial adjustment 
of VC pay explained by the difference between the two external pay benchmarks was also 
statistically significant. Thus, whilst average VC pay increased by some 40% over the period, this 
was significantly less than the increase in the pay of comparable UK CEOs. We suggest that this 
conservatism by university remuneration committees stems largely from political rather than 
financial constraints. 
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Pay Comparisons: An Analysis of UK University Vice Chancellor’s Pay Awards  
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper examines the pay awards received by UK University chief executive officers, i.e., 
“Vice Chancellors” (VC)1, over the 6 year period from 1997 to 2002. Traditionally, VC pay has 
reflected internal university pay structures that shared many of the characteristics of public sector 
bureaucracies, i.e., an extreme “compression” of relative pay rates between grades and 
significantly lower salaries or incentives for top management than in the case of comparable 
profit-oriented organisations (Cragg and Dyck, 2000). In this context, VC pay awards were 
wholly uncontroversial as their pay levels were relatively low, with pay awards closely related to 
what was received by other University employees and those in comparable public sector 
positions. However, due to successive UK governments being unwilling to pay the full costs 
associated with their ambitious expansion policies over the past 20 or so years, universities have 
had to find ways of lowering their unit costs (e.g., by adopting less costly teaching methods) 
and/or of generating alternative income streams, primarily from research contracts and fees from 
postgraduates and non-UK/EU students.   The increased competition for fee-paying students and 
research funds has impacted on internal pay structures as universities have had to compete for 
high quality academic faculty and to recruit new and often relatively highly paid, specialists (e.g., 
in finance or marketing) to identify and manage these new income streams. In this new 
competitive environment, internal university pay and incentive systems, particularly at those 
institutions most successful at attracting additional research and teaching income, have inevitably 
become more “tournament-like” and flexible to reflect external labour market conditions.  
 
Though the opening up of internal pay structures has improved the pay of many managerial, 
professional and professorial grade employees, the most widely-reported consequence of this 
process is the fact that VC pay has risen at a consistently faster rate than the pay of most other 
University employees. Indeed, VC pay awards have become highly controversial. As can be seen 
from Figure 1, which documents the reporting of and reactions to VC pay awards each year from 
1995 to 2003 published in the Times Higher Educational Supplement (THES), the THES Leader 
and editorials and the reactions from Union spokespersons, the annual publication of VC pay 
details now invariably produces highly critical comments (e.g., “outrageous”, “shameless”) from 
academic Union officials unable to negotiate similar percentage pay awards for their members.  
Nevertheless, as is apparent from many of the comments in Figure 1, VC’s remain relatively 
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poorly paid compared with comparable professionals or the CEOs of similar-sized UK 
organisations.  For example, the highest paid VC in 1995, Derek Roberts of University College 
London, who had formally been a director of GEC, claimed that “his pay had fallen by a factor of 
3 when he moved to UCL.”  
 
We argue that university remuneration committees, particularly now that increasing numbers of 
new VCs are being appointed from outside the university sector, necessarily have to base VC pay 
awards upon some combination of internal and external labour market pay comparisons.  Even 
so, despite the fact that average VC pay levels – and to a lesser extent the pay of other senior staff  
-  have risen significantly, we argue that political factors, primarily academic labour union 
complaints about VC pay rises, rather than financial constraints have inhibited remuneration 
committees from raising VC pay anywhere close to the levels typically received by the CEOs 
running comparable- sized UK companies.  
 
The paper is structured as follows.  In section two, we discuss the pay setting process, in 
particular the role of remuneration committees, and the empirical findings relating to CEO pay 
awards in the UK.  The financial and governance issues currently confronting UK Universities, 
and the system by which VC and other senior staff pay is determined are discussed in section 3.  
The empirical hypotheses, empirical models, data and variables used to evaluate the determinants 
of VC pay awards are presented in section 4.   The empirical results, which focus on VC pay 
changes and include analyses relating to both the full sample and the pre-1992 and post-1992 
University sub-samples, are presented and discussed in section 5.  The final section examines the 
implications of our findings for the UK University sector and for the broader and continuing 
debates concerning the effectiveness of remuneration committees in controlling executive 
compensation. 
 
2. Remuneration Committees and CEO Pay in the UK 
 
There has been much media and public interest in the apparently “excessive” and “unjustified” 
pay increases enjoyed by senior executives in both the US and the UK over the past 15 years or 
so.  The notions of “excessive” or “unjustified” pay awards are, of course, highly value laden and 
in much media reporting appear to be synonymous with CEO’s and other senior executives 
receiving high pay awards relative to either (1) other employees and/or (2) irrespective of any 
obvious improvements in the performance of their organisations.  Certainly, the average pay of 
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senior executives, particularly the CEO, in the US and UK has increased at a much faster rate 
than that of other employees (Conyon and Murphy, 2000) and many empirical studies have failed 
to produce convincing evidence that CEO pay increases have been related to improvements in 
firm performance (Barkama and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). For example, many published studies have 
tested CEO pay change models of the following form:  
 
              LnWit+1 -LnWit =  α + Σβ(Performance)it   + uit                           (1)  
where: 
 LnWit+1 -LnWit = the log change in CEO pay between time t and t+1, 
α = the estimated constant term which represents the average proportionate change in CEO pay 
between time t and t+1 when Σβ(Performance)it   = 0,  
Σβ(Performance)it   = a vector of one or more firm performance indicators and their respective 
estimated β coefficients observed at time t and, 
uit = the estimated residuals representing the unexplained variance in CEO pay changes. 
 
As Conyon, et al (1995) have argued, the majority of reported empirical estimates of equation (1) 
have tended to indicate that such models have relatively low explanatory power and typically 
result in highly significant positive estimated α’s and small and/or insignificant β coefficient(s) 
irrespective of either the firm performance measure(s) used or the definition of CEO pay being 
tested.   
 
Some academics have attributed these results to managerial power, or simply greed.  Bebchuk 
and Fried (2003), for example, contend that managerial entrenchment and poor independent 
director monitoring and control are endemic in the US due to its explicitly manager-friendly 
corporate laws and limited shareholder rights. To these authors, managerial entrenchment and 
control over the board of directors, coupled with diversified (and hence largely acquiescent) 
shareholders, are the primarily factors responsible for recent hikes in executive pay because they 
allow managers to effectively determine their own pay.  Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue that the 
only constraints upon pay are disclosure rules that make it more difficult to disguise and/or avoid 
reporting the real costs to shareholders and the increased risk of provoking shareholder revolts 
and public “outrage”.   
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The managerial power framework is useful in focusing attention on the ever-present possibility 
that entrenched executives may be able to extract substantial economic rents from their positions. 
However, this framework does not fit well with the observation that when CEOs move firms, i.e., 
when by definition they are not entrenched, they appear to experience few difficulties in being 
able to negotiate even more generous pay packages for themselves than they had with their 
previous employer.   Also, managerial power does not appear to provide a convincing explanation 
as to why CEO pay has increased in similar ways throughout the developed world irrespective of 
the significant differences between countries in terms of managerial entrenchment and the 
presence of alternative corporate governance control mechanisms. For example, UK corporate 
law and governance, though similar to the US in terms of legal origins (English common law), 
disclosure and financial reporting, unitary boards, remuneration committees and an apparently 
identical shareholder focus, provides much more extensive shareholder voting rights and powers 
to control and dismiss the board of directors.  These stronger shareholder rights, along with 
higher levels of institutional ownership and fewer constraints on the market for corporate control, 
have not produced significant managerial entrenchment problems for the UK.  Even so, the UK 
has experienced much the same pattern of rapidly rising CEO pay unrelated to firm performance 
improvements as has the US (Conyon and Murphy, 2000).   
 
Many financial economists (for a review, see Conyon, 2006) have taken the more plausible view 
that the general increase in executive pay reflects changes in the price firms are willing to pay for 
scarce executive and other specialist human capital.  It has frequently been argued that firms have 
been willing to pay senior executives more due to the increasing size, complexity and profit 
making opportunities of firms. The theoretical literature suggests that greater competition for 
scarce human capital will generate internal promotion and pay outcomes that have all the 
attributes of competitive “tournaments” (e.g., Lazear, 1989, Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Martin, 
2001; O’Reilley, et al, 1988).  Tournaments necessarily produce much more diverse pay 
outcomes as the value of the winner’s “trophy” (the wage increase from the promotion and the 
opportunity to progress to the next hierarchical level) increases disproportionately in order to 
motivate the requisite degree of competition for key positions within the organisation. Another 
implication of tournament theory is that greater competition and higher rewards lower down the 
organisational hierarchy will necessarily lead to proportionately larger pay increases for more 
senior organisational members.   
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In both the US and UK, remuneration committees, consisting of part time, non-executive 
directors that meet on average only twice per year, have long been the institutional mechanism by 
which these internal and external labour market pressures have been translated into senior 
executive pay awards (for a review, see Stiles and Taylor, 2000). In the UK, every corporate 
governance code from Cadbury (1992) to the current “Combined Code” (2002) has recommended 
that remuneration committees take account of  labour market pressures by basing pay awards 
primarily upon what “comparable” companies were paying their executives and, for incentive 
alignment purposes, to make pay more closely related to improvements in firm performance2.  In 
practice, this encouragement of remuneration committees to focus on pay comparisons and 
performance related pay has tended to increase CEO pay levels as risk averse and resource 
constrained remuneration committees have sought to avoid being perceived as under-valuing 
their senior executives.  The evidence suggests that remuneration committees have realised that 
they can minimise the possibility of boardroom conflict, recruitment and retention problems and 
inadvertently signalling low managerial quality to outsiders, simply by paying their CEO 
somewhat more than the apparent market rate.  Though, from the perspective of each individual 
remuneration committee, being relatively generous to the CEO is a reasonable strategy, the 
statistical impossibility for all CEOs to be paid more than average implies that their average pay 
levels will necessarily be “bid-up” over time.3   
 
Remuneration committees’ apparent “bidding-up” of executive pay has not, however, gone 
unnoticed by the business world.  For example, the Institute of Directors (1995:4) felt obliged to 
advise its members that remuneration committees “should avoid setting packages which are 
generous in relation to market levels and beware of pressure always to be in the ‘upper quartile’”. 
In a similar fashion, the Combined Code has also highlighted this same problem: 
“B.1.2 Remuneration committees should judge where to position their company relative to other 
companies. They should be aware what comparable companies are paying and should take 
account of relative performance. But they should use such comparisons with caution, in view of 
the risk that they can result in an upward ratchet of remuneration levels with no corresponding 
improvement in performance….” 
 
It will be noted that though they were both able to recognise the tendency for remuneration 
committees to raise pay levels, neither the Institute of Directors nor the drafters of the Combined 
Code felt able to offer any suggestions as to how to reduce the problem.  
A recent study by Ogden and Watson (2004), which focused on the UK water industry, has 
indicated that external political-stakeholder pressure can substantially limit the willingness of 
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remuneration committees to ratchet up CEO pay. When they were privatized in 1989, the water 
companies had to rapidly transform themselves from public sector monopoly suppliers into 
market driven enterprises capable of earning a reasonable rate of return to their shareholders from 
their portfolio of regulated activities and non-regulated post-privatisation investments. This 
transformation from public sector bureaucracies into publicly listed enterprises ought to have led 
to the rapid adoption of pay levels and practices similar to other listed companies (see Cragg and 
Dyck, 2000).4  Nevertheless, throughout the early 1990’s, the water companies were subject to 
much public criticism arising from increased charges (due largely to the costs associated with 
new regulatory standards) and a widespread, but demonstrably false, belief that their CEOs were 
grossly overpaid and that excessive executive pay was responsible for the increased charges to 
customers.5  Despite good post-privatisation corporate performance, subsequent to these widely 
reported public criticisms, the pay of the water company CEOs rose only modestly in comparison 
to the pay increases received by other UK CEOs.   
 
Interviews with remuneration committee chairmen reported in Ogden and Watson (2004) 
confirmed that the intense media and political scrutiny of the remuneration committee’s decisions 
had not merely inhibited increases in CEO salaries but, in 1995 after being criticised by the 
Greenbury Report (1995), had resulted in all the water companies abandoning their recently 
introduced executive share option programmes. The interviewees reported that these episodes had 
made them very concerned with ensuring that they could “justify” their pay decisions to outsider 
stakeholders and that they had the support of major shareholders prior to making any major pay 
decisions.  This circumspection brought about by political pressures clearly constrained water 
company CEO pay awards but, as the committee chairmen were anxious to point out, the 
constraints on pay were causing recruitment and retention problems and the extensive 
“legitimation” exercise also consumed significant corporate resources.  For example, the water 
company remuneration committees typically had 8 meetings per year, which is some 4 times the 
average number of meetings per annum that other UK companies have (Conyon, et al, 2000).  
Clearly though, in the absence of strong regulatory and/or political pressure, most remuneration 
committees have had neither the resources nor any incentives to risk paying their executives 
significantly less than the pay received by comparable executives employed elsewhere. 
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3. UK University Governance and Vice Chancellor’s Pay 
 
Though UK universities are still often thought of as quasi-public sector organisations, over recent 
years they have acquired many of the characteristics, cash flow risks and pay practices of 
commercial enterprises. Indeed, UK Universities are legally independent, Charitable (i.e., non-
profit making) institutions; that is, they are not owned by the State, their debts are not guaranteed 
by any public body, their employees are not public servants, no government representatives sit on 
their governing councils and each institution is free to pursue their own student and staff 
recruitment policies, research missions and other investment strategies.  UK Universities operate 
in accordance with their own voluntary code of governance, published by the “Committee of 
University Chairmen” (CUC, 2002, 2004). The governing bodies of UK Universities, the 
“University Council”6, performs all the same functions as the “board of directors” of commercial 
corporations: 
“ 3.2 The council is the executive governing body of the university.  It is responsible for the 
university’s finances and investments and for the management of the university estate and 
buildings... subject to the powers of the senate in academic matters, the council has responsibility 
for the conduct of all the affairs of the university.” (CUC 2002, p. 11). 
 
University Councils are expected to meet between 3 and 6 times per year and in 2001 had an 
average membership of 33 (CUC, 2002, p 11).  Not surprisingly given the many distinct 
constituencies represented on the councils, this is more than twice the average size of the boards 
of directors of comparable UK companies. Just as UK company boards are required by the 
Combined Code to have an independent Chairman and a majority of independent directors, so too 
are University Councils: 
“3.3 It is an important principle that the council has a lay majority, that is a majority of members 
who are not staff or students of the university.  Its membership … will typically include officers 
of the university, both lay and academic, members appointed by the court, members appointed by 
the senate, co-opted members, local authority representatives, elected staff members and student 
representatives …. (p. 11). 
 
The CUC code also unambiguously describes the VC as “the chief executive of the university” 
with “overall responsibility for the executive management of the institution and for its day-to-day 
direction, and is accountable to the council (and in some universities to the senate) for the 
exercise of these responsibilities” (CUC, 2002, p13).  The process by which VC and other senior 
staff pay awards are determined is, to all intents and purposes, identical to that obtaining in the 
private sector: 
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“4.43 Governing bodies should establish a remuneration committee to determine and review 
the salaries, terms and conditions (and, where appropriate, severance payments) of the head of 
the institution and such other members of staff as the governing body deems appropriate.  A 
minimum membership of such a committee should be the chairman of the governing body 
and at least three other lay/independent members, including the lay treasurer if such an office 
exists.  The head of the institution should also be a member of the committee for all salaries 
except his/her own.  Any member of staff should withdraw from the committee when his/her 
own salary, terms and conditions or severance payments are under consideration. 
 
4.44 The remuneration committee should seek comparative information on salaries and other 
benefits and conditions of service in the higher education sector.  Two sources of information 
are available: the CUC has a database of salaries, benefits and conditions of service for heads 
of institution (currently available only to chairmen of governing bodies); and the Universities 
and Colleges Employers’ Association (UCEA) collects data on the salaries of other highly-
graded staff. 
 
4.45 When considering severance arrangements for senior staff, the remuneration committee 
must represent the public interest and avoid any inappropriate use of public funds.  The 
committee should be careful not to agree to a severance package which staff, students and the 
public might deem excessive.  Contracts of employment for senior staff should specify 
periods of notice of not more than 12 months, and should not provide for pension 
enhancements.” (CUC, 2002, p 26) 
 
Thus, the VC’s pay is determined by a remuneration committee made up of independent 
“outsiders” (prominent local and national figures in business, politics, professional associations 
and the arts and media) drawn from the membership of each university’s governing Council. As 
can be seen from the above extract, apart from the warning “not to agree to a severance package 
which staff, students and the public might deem excessive”, the CUC code does not offer 
remuneration committees any guidance as to the criteria they ought to employ in determining an 
appropriate and acceptable level of VC pay.   The committee members are, however, supplied 
with comparative pay information regarding what other UK VC’s and other highly paid 
university staff earn.  They also have ready access to a third source of comparative pay 
information because prior to deciding the VC’s pay, the remuneration committee will typically 
have made pay awards in respect of all the professors and other senior staff and in their 
institution.    
 
The remuneration committee will also have a fourth potential source of relevant comparative pay 
information available to them, either from pay consultants or from personal experience from 
being an executive or board member elsewhere; namely the pay received by other UK CEOs.  
The pay received by CEOs ought to be a relevant benchmark for remuneration committees since 
the CUC code describes the post of VC as the highest executive position in a UK university, with 
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much the same leadership, financial, operational and strategic responsibilities as the CEOs of 
conventional business organisations.  Whilst a minority of universities, predominantly “post-
1992” institutions that were granted independence and University status only in (or, in a few 
cases, after)1992, still obtain the majority of their income from regulated UK and EU 
undergraduate numbers and fees, many of the high status pre-1992 institutions have successfully 
pursued strategies that have significantly reduced their dependence upon State-funding.   Though 
the pre-1992 institutions typically still receive significant sums of public money for core research 
from performing well in terms of the peer-review driven RAE, much of their income now comes 
from non-public sources such as commercial sponsors of research and other services and the 
recruitment of significant numbers of (non-EU) undergraduates and postgraduate students willing 
to pay realistic market course fees.   
 
As can be seen from the descriptive statistics presented in Table 1, there was already a high 
degree of diversity between institutions in terms of research income, the composition of the 
student intake and internal wage structures in 1997.  Over the subsequent 5 years to 2002, it can 
also been seen that this diversity increased as universities with already high academic reputations 
(the pre-1992 group) have tended to be more successful at generating additional research and fee 
income. As universities have become ever more exposed to national and international 
competition for students, research funds and high quality research and professional staff, it seems 
unlikely that their remuneration committees will view the VC’s job as being any less difficult or 
complex than the jobs of CEOs running similar sized commercial enterprises.   
 
 In financial terms, it is not obvious from the descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 why VC 
pay has become a contentious issue.  Average University income was almost £124million in 
2002, having increased by slightly more than 30% between 1997 and 2002, whilst average VC 
pay was almost £140,000 in 2002, having increased by 39% over the same period.  The average 
increase in VC pay over the five years of approximately £40,000 is quite trivial and accounts for 
a mere 1.33% of the £30million increase in University income over the same period.  Both the 
level of VC pay in 2002 (£139,500) and the £40,000 average increase are also very low when 
compared to the £403,400 average pay of the Datastream UK CEOs in 2002 and their £120,000 
average increase in pay over the same period.  Indeed, VC pay levels seem particularly low in 
comparison to our estimate of what they ought to be paid on the basis of the Datastream pay level 
Model parameters.7  On this basis, average VC pay in 2002 ought to be more than £200,000 
higher at £342,700, having risen by some £140,000 over the previous five years to reflect 
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increases in total income and the pay received by other UK CEOs.  Moreover, it is clear from the 
figures in Table 1, which detail the large percentage increases in the number of staff, particularly 
in the pre-1992 Universities that have earnings in excess of £50,000 and £100,000, that internal 
pay systems have been made much more responsive to external labour market pressures and that, 
as a consequence, VCs have not been alone in receiving relatively large pay rises over recent 
years.   
 
Whilst it ought to be obvious from the figures involved that the extra £40,000 typically paid to 
VCs will have had no discernable negative impact on University finances or the ability or 
willingness of an institution to award pay increases to other employees, the academic staff trade 
unions have been highly critical of these fairly modest rises in VC pay.   The percentage increase 
in average VC pay is, of course, significantly higher than the 16.3% average increase in the 
nationally negotiated pay awards to academic and academic-related staff below the grade of 
professor over the same 5 year period.8  Remuneration committees have no involvement in these 
nationally negotiated pay settlements. The academic labour unions, who have always insisted 
upon national bargaining, negotiate directly with the Universities and Colleges Employers’ 
Association (UCEA).   An obvious corollary of these national pay bargaining arrangements is 
that pay settlements are necessarily constrained by the parsimony of State funding and what the 
poorest institutions can “afford to pay”.  What ought to be equally obvious is that these financial 
constraints are irrelevant to remuneration committees when considering the VC’s pay.  As can be 
seen from Figure 1, the academic trade unions have consistently focused attention on the apparent 
“unfairness” of the disparity between VC pay awards and the typically much smaller awards to 
their members. Perhaps not surprisingly, Figure 1 also shows that the relatively few comments 
published in the THES from VCs or spokespersons of their collective lobby group (CVCP/UUK) 
have been largely restricted to drawing comparisons with the pay received by CEOs of similar-
sized firms and/or market competition to get the best staff.  
 
4. Hypotheses and Empirical Modelling of VC Pay Awards9  
 
In this section we present our hypotheses and describe the empirical methods used to model and 
test our hypotheses relating to UK VC pay awards.  From the reviews of the process by which 
remuneration committees determine CEO and VC pay, it is evident that motivational, retention 
and signalling concerns have a pronounced tendency to ratchet up pay because, in the absence of 
binding financial or political constraints and/or poor corporate performance, remuneration 
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committees will tend to play safe and award their CEO's pay increases that are generous relative 
to the external firm size/pay comparisons.   
 
Particularly in institutions that derive a large proportion of their income from commercial 
activities, remuneration committees can be expected to view the salaries received by the CEOs of 
similar sized UK firms as being the most appropriate benchmark for determining their VC’s pay.  
However, due primarily to perceived political (rather than financial) constraints, university 
remuneration committees are expected to demonstrate some caution and only partially adjust their 
VC’s pay towards the external CEO pay benchmark.  
 
Given the above, we evaluate the following five hypotheses in relation to UK University VC  
pay awards: 
 
H1: Remuneration committees will reward VCs for improvements in University performance 
and, therefore, VC pay awards will be a function of observable changes in the size and 
composition of each University’s total income and student numbers. 
 
H2: Remuneration committees that have awarded high pay to other senior University staff will 
want to increase their VCs pay to maintain internal pay hierarchies and therefore VC pay awards 
will be positively related to the increase in the proportion of other high paid University 
colleagues.  
 
H3: Remuneration committees will attempt to align their VC pay with the pay received by the 
VCs of similar-sized UK Universities and therefore VC pay awards will be influenced by 
observable deviations of their pay from an external (to the University) VC pay benchmark. 
 
H3a: When Remuneration committees perceive that the pay of their VC is lower than the external 
(to the University) VC pay benchmark, they will make a larger adjustment towards this VC pay 
benchmark than when the VC appears to be overpaid relative to this VC pay benchmark. 
 
H4: Remuneration committees will view the pay received by the CEOs of similar-sized UK 
companies as being an appropriate pay level for their VC but, due to perceived political 
constraints, will be prepared to only partially adjust VC pay to this higher level in any one year. 
Hence, empirically, VC pay awards will be characterised by a partial adjustment related to their 
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perceived underpayment relative to an observable external (to the University sector) CEO pay 
benchmark.  
 
H5: Remuneration committees will view the pay received by the CEOs of similar-sized UK 
companies as being an appropriate pay level for their VC but, due to political constraints, will 
adjust VC pay more readily to deviations from the external VC pay benchmark than to deviations 
in VC pay from the (higher) CEO pay benchmark.  Hence, empirically, VC pay awards will be 
characterised by a positive partial adjustment to deviations from the external VC pay benchmark 
(as for H3), plus a much smaller positive adjustment of VC pay to the remaining deviation of VC 
pay from the CEO pay benchmark. 
 
 The empirical evaluation of the above hypotheses utilises a number of pay change models.  To 
evaluate H1 and H2, we use an augmented version of equation (1) as follows: 
 
LnWit+1 -LnWit =  α +  βLn∆(Incomeit)  + βLn∆(Total Studentsit)  + βLn∆(PG Studentsit)  + 
βLn∆(Overseas Studentsit)  + βLn∆(Research Incomeit) +  βLn∆(Staff >£50kit) +  uit+1        (2)  
 
Where: 
LnWit+1 -LnWit =  the (natural) log change in VC total pay between time t and t+1, 
Ln∆(Incomeit)  =  the (natural) log change in University Income (Sales) between time t-1 and t, 
Ln∆(Total Studentsit)  = the (natural) log change in student enrolments between time t-1 and t, 
Ln∆(PG Studentsit) = the (natural) log change in postgraduate student enrolments between time 
t-1 and t, 
Ln∆(Overseas Studentsit) = the (natural) log change in overseas (non-UK/EU) student 
enrolments between time t-1 and t,  
Ln∆(Research Incomeit) = the (natural) log change in research income between time t-1 and t, 
Ln∆(Staff >£50kit) = the (natural) log change in the number of University staff earning more 
than £50,000 between time t-1 and t, 
uit+1 = the regression residuals. 
 
We refer to this pay change model, which includes only internal (to the University) explanatory 
variables, as “Model 2”.  Estimated coefficients that are both positive and significant on one or 
more of the five performance measures would be evidence consistent with H1.  A positive and 
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statistically significant coefficient on the Ln∆(Staff >£50kit) variable would provide evidence 
consistent with H2. 
 
In order to test hypotheses H3 and H3a, the impact of the external VC pay benchmark upon VC 
pay awards, we augment Model 2 with the following two variables: 
 
LnWit+1 -LnWit =  Model 2 +  β(LnWVCit-LnWit) +  β(LnWVCit-LnWit > 0)        (3)  
 
Where: 
(LnWVCit-LnWit) =  the difference between the estimated (natural) log VC pay benchmark at 
time t and the (natural) log of the VC’s actual pay at time t. 
(LnWVCit-LnWit > 0) = an interaction term that equals (LnWVCit-LnWit) if (LnWVCit-LnWit) > 0  
and zero otherwise. 
 
We refer to this model as “Model 3”.  Empirical support for H3 would require the coefficient on 
the VC pay benchmark anomaly variable, i.e., (LnWVCit-LnWit), to be significantly positive.  
Empirical support for H3a, the “bidding-up” or “pay ratchet” effect, would require the coefficient 
on the interaction term that identifies those individual VCs that are underpaid relative to the VC 
pay benchmark to be significantly positive. 
 
The empirical testing of hypothesis H4, the CEO pay benchmark model which we refer to as 
“Model 4”, also makes use of an augmented version of Model 2 as follows: 
 
LnWit+1 -LnWit    =    Model 2  +  β(LnWCEOit - LnWit)                                  (4)  
 
Where: 
(LnWCEOit - LnWit) =  the difference between the estimated (natural) log CEO pay benchmark at 
time t and the (natural) log of the VC’s actual pay at time t. 
 
As H4 asserts that VC pay awards will constitute a partial adjustment to the (in all cases, higher) 
pay received by the CEOs of comparable-sized UK firms, empirical support for H4 would require 
that the coefficient on the CEO pay anomaly variable be significantly greater than zero but 
significantly smaller than 1 (which would imply a full adjustment to the apparent underpayment).  
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In order to test hypothesis H5, which asserts that remuneration committees will differentially 
adjust VC pay to the two external pay anomaly variables, we use the following model, which we 
refer to as “Model 5”: 
 
 LnWit+1 -LnWit =  Model 2 +  β(LnWVCit - LnWit) +  β(LnWCEOit - LnWVCit)        (5)  
 
Where: 
(LnWVCit - LnWit) = the VC pay benchmark anomaly variable as for Model 3, 
(LnWCEOit - LnWVCit) = the (natural) log difference between the CEO and VC pay benchmarks.         
 
It will be noted that in Model 5, the CEO pay anomaly variable used in Model 4, i.e., (LnWCEOit - 
LnWit), has now been partitioned into two separate variables; namely, (LnWVCit - LnWit), the 
VC pay anomaly, and (LnWCEOit - LnWVCit), the difference in the two external pay benchmarks.  
Empirical support for H5 requires that the estimated coefficient on the VC pay anomaly variable 
will be significantly positive, i.e., β(LnWVCit - LnWit) > 0, and the coefficient on the difference 
between the two pay benchmarks to be significantly positive, i.e. i.e., β(LnWCEOit - LnWVCit) > 0.  
However, H5 also implies that, due to political constraints, the latter coefficient will be 
significantly smaller than the coefficient on the VC pay anomaly variable, i.e., 
                      β(LnWVCit - LnWit) > β(LnWCEOit - LnWVCit) > 0. 
Clearly, in order to estimate models 3 to 5, and hence to test hypotheses H3 to H5, we need to 
provide reasonable proxies for the two external pay benchmarks, WVC and WCEO.  The most 
comprehensive VC external pay benchmark proxy available to us is the predicted VC pay levels 
from estimating the following time t VC pay level model on our UK University dataset: 
 
LnWit =  Yt +  βLn(Incomeit-1)  + βLn(Total Studentsit-1)  + βLn(PG Studentsit-1)  + 
  βLn(Overseas Studentsit-1)  + βLn(Research Incomeit-1) +  βLn(Staff >£50kit) +  uit             
(6)  
Where: 
LnWit =  the (natural) log of VC total pay at time t, 
Yt = the constant and t-1 year dummy variables, 
Ln(Incomeit-1)  =  the (natural) log of University Income (Sales) at time t-1, 
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Ln(Total Studentsit-1)  = the (natural) log of total student enrolments at time t-1, 
Ln(PG Studentsit-1) = the (natural) log of postgraduate student enrolments at time t-1, 
Ln(Overseas Studentsit-1) = the (natural) log of overseas (non-UK/EU) student enrolments at 
time t-1,  
Ln(Research Incomeit-1) = the (natural) log of research income at time t-1, 
Ln(Staff >£50kit) = the (natural) log of the number of University staff earning more than £50,000 
at time t, 
uit = the regression residuals. 
 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) and generalised least squares (Random Effects) estimates of 
equation (6) are shown in Table 3, under the columns headed “VC Pay Model 2”.  It will be noted 
that the two estimation methods produce almost identical coefficients and that the model is able 
to account for slightly more than 50% of the cross-sectional variation in (logged) VC pay levels.  
However, with the exception of the high earning staff and University size (Income) variables, 
none of the other University characteristics are significantly positively related to VC pay levels.  
Moreover, due to high correlations between each of the variables10, three have negative estimated 
coefficients.  Though it makes no discernable difference to the reported results, for these reasons 
we use the predicted values estimated from the more parsimonious Model 1 as our proxy for the 
VC external pay benchmark.  Whilst this model includes only the total income variable, it is 
efficient since it is still successful at explaining almost 48% of the cross sectional variation in VC 
pay.  Perhaps more importantly, its limited information requirements can be expected to more 
closely replicate the limited comparative VC pay data provided to and/or capable of being 
processed by university remuneration committees. 
 
To empirically evaluate hypotheses H4 and H5, we also need to provide an equivalent empirical 
proxy for the external CEO pay benchmark, i.e., the pay that VCs would receive if they were 
being paid on a comparable basis to other UK CEOs running similar-sized UK companies. This is 
accomplished by first estimating the following CEO pay level model using 1996 to 2001 data 
relating to all non-financial UK listed firms available on the Datastream database with a sales 
turnover of between £20million and £1billion (a total of 3258 firm-years): 
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LnWit = Yt + βLn(SALES it-1)  +  β(Shareholder Returnsit) +  uit                (7) 
 
Where: 
LnWit = natural log of total cash (salary plus cash bonuses) pay for CEO i in time t, 
Yt = the constant and t-1 year dummy variables to control for time-varying common effects,  
Ln(SALESit-1) = natural log of total sales of firm i in time t-1, and, 
Shareholder Returnsit = total returns (dividend yield plus share price changes adjusted for capital 
splits in time t).  
 
As UK Universities are clearly unlisted and not-for-profit organisations, we ignore the element of 
CEO pay related to shareholder returns and calculate the predicted external CEO pay benchmark, 
Ln(WCEOit), as follows: 
 
              Ln(WCEOit) = Yt + β Ln(Incomeit-1)                            (8) 
Where:  
 Yt + β are the estimated parameters of the constant, time dummies and Sales variables estimated 
from (7) and Ln(Incomeit-1) is the natural log of University i’s total income in time t-1. 
 
Ln(WCEOit) is therefore the estimated pay at time t that a VC would receive if s/he was paid on 
the same sales turnover (Income) basis as other UK CEOs. 
 
The first column of Table 3 contains the estimated parameters of our Datastream derived CEO 
pay level benchmark model detailed in equation (7).  As with many previous studies, this 
relatively simple pay level model performs quite well in terms of explanatory power (adjusted R2 
= 33.5%), particularly as it has been estimated using a very heterogeneous sample of firms in 
terms of both sectors and sizes. Consistent with previous studies, CEO cash pay (salary and 
bonuses) is strongly positively related to firm size (sales turnover) and increasing annual 
intercepts (year dummies) over time that reflect the general rises in CEO pay unrelated to either 
changes in firm size or performance.  The shareholder returns variable is quite small in magnitude 
and, moreover, statistically insignificant. Again, this is consistent with many previous studies that 
have shown shareholder returns and accounting performance measures to be of relatively little 
statistical or economic importance in explaining the level of CEO pay across any relatively 
heterogeneous sample of firms.  
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For comparison purposes, in the next 2 columns, we provide estimates of the same pay level 
model (excluding the shareholder returns variable) but using UK VC and university data.  The 
first VC pay model includes all observations for which the relevant VC and University data are 
available.  Comparison with the Datastream CEO pay level model reveals a slightly higher 
intercept and smaller and less significant dummy variable coefficients.  The main difference 
however lies in the magnitude of the size variable coefficient, which at less than 0.1 is 
approximately only 40% of the size of the estimated Datastream parameter.  Even so, as can be 
seen from the results presented in the third column, our second VC model, which excludes 3 
institutions (18 observations) that were the largest and most consistent outliers, the slope 
coefficient on the size variable was biased downwards by a few unrepresentative observations.  
The three institutions excluded were certainly a-typical, namely, Oxford and Cambridge (whose 
VC’s appeared to be extremely underpaid given the large size of their respective institutions) and 
the London Business School (whose Director was exceptionally well-paid relative to all other 
VCs, particularly so given the relatively small size of LBS).  As can be seen from Table 3, 
excluding these outliers greatly improves the explanatory power of the model and results in an 
increase in the size and significance of the size variable coefficient and a corresponding fall in the 
intercept. As mentioned above, the predicted VC pay levels derived from Model 1 (excluding the 
outliers) constitutes our external VC pay benchmark, Ln(WVCit). 
 
It will be recalled that Model 5 examines the relative influence of both external pay benchmarks.  
The correlation coefficient of 0.94 between our estimates of Ln(WCEOit) and Ln(WVCit), shown in 
section A of Table 2, indicates that, despite the large difference in the means of these two 
external pay benchmarks and the differing Model 1 Datastream and VC parameters shown in the 
Table 3 pay level estimates, they appear to be close substitutes for one another.  As can be seen 
from Section B of Table 2, the correlation between the two external pay benchmark measures 
falls to 0.79 when these pay benchmarks are expressed as deviations from the VC’s actual pay. 
Even so, this still very high level of correlation ought not to cause estimation problems since the 
CEO pay benchmark variable used in this model, (LnWCEOit - LnWVCit), measures only the 
difference between the two external pay benchmarks and this is uncorrelated with the VC pay 
benchmark variable also included in the estimating equation.  
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Though in practice, actual pay levels may be related to a potentially large number of observable 
and unobservable individual human capital and organisational factors, in pay change models 
these factors become irrelevant if they do not alter over time, i.e., they are fixed effects. This 
ability to ignore such fixed effects justifies our use of the parsimonious pay change models.  
However, the assumption of unchanging human capital attributes is clearly violated when there 
has been a change in the individual holding the post of VC.  As new VCs tend to be younger and 
less experienced than the outgoing (usually retiring) VC, the change in VC is likely to be 
associated with a reduction in VC pay that needs to be controlled for.  Our reported empirical VC 
pay change estimates all include an additional “change in VC” dummy variable which is coded 1 
if there has been a change in VC between time t and t+1 and zero otherwise.11     
 
5.  Empirical Results 
 
Table 4 presents the main empirical findings of our analysis of changes in VC pay. In all the 
individual model estimates, the change in VC dummy variable is, as expected, statistically 
negative at 1% levels of confidence. The first column of Table 4, Model 2, contains the empirical 
estimates to evaluate hypotheses H1 and H2. Hypothesis H1, that VC pay changes ought to be 
positively related to one or more of the University performance variables, is not supported.  
Though the overall explanatory power of the model is statistically significant at 1% confidence 
levels, very little of this explanatory power results from the inclusion of the performance 
variables.  Rather, the explanatory power of Model 2 comes almost wholly from the inclusion of 
the change in VC dummy variable and the internal pay comparison variable, the change in the 
proportion of staff earning greater than £50,000.  This latter variable it will be recalled is included 
to evaluate H2, that VC pay awards would be influenced by internal pay pressures.  As the 
positive coefficient on this variable is statistically significant at 1% levels of confidence, this 
provides empirical support for hypothesis H2.  It will be noted from the other models shown in 
Table 4 that the above results in relation to the lack of statistical support for H1 and the strong 
statistical support for H2 are robust to changes in the model specifications.  
 
The empirical estimates presented under the column headed Model 3 in Table 4 provide the 
evidence to evaluate hypotheses H3, that VC pay awards would be positively related to 
observable deviations from the external VC pay benchmark, and H3a, there being a “bidding up” 
of VC pay due to relatively underpaid VCs experiencing a larger adjustment in pay than similarly 
overpaid VCs.  The results provide statistical support for H3, i.e., the coefficient of 0.241 on the 
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VC pay anomaly variable is significantly positive.  However, there appears to be no support for 
H3a, the bidding up hypothesis, since the estimated coefficient on the underpaid VC interaction 
term is actually negative, though not significantly so.  Whilst these Model 3 empirical estimates 
suggest that no bidding up of VC pay seems to have occurred due to remuneration committees 
awarding relatively underpaid VCs more generous pay rises, the significantly positive constant 
term indicates that VC’s generally may have experienced pay rises of approximately 7% per 
annum completely independently of university performance and irrespective of their relative pay 
levels.  
 
Model 4, which includes the external CEO pay benchmark anomaly variable, evaluates 
hypothesis H4, the influence upon VC pay awards resulting from remuneration committees 
making a partial adjustment of VC pay towards the pay levels typically received by the CEOs of 
comparable sized UK firms.  Though the overall explanatory power of the model is somewhat 
lower than for model 3, the reported results are consistent with H4 as the estimated coefficient of 
0.155 on this CEO pay benchmark variable is statistically significant at 1% confidence levels.   
However, as indicated earlier, the correlation between the VC and CEO pay benchmarks is very 
high and the statistical significance of the CEO pay benchmark variable may simply be a function 
of this high correlation between the two variables.  The specification of Model 5 allows for the 
evaluation of whether the CEO pay benchmark variable has any incremental explanatory power 
when the VC pay benchmark variable is included in the estimating equation.  Model 5 also 
evaluates the more specific predictions associated with hypothesis H5.  Hypothesis H5 predicts 
that the estimated coefficient on the difference between the VC and CEO pay benchmarks ought 
to be significantly positive but, due to perceived political constraints upon VC pay rises, of a 
much smaller magnitude than the estimated coefficient on the VC pay anomaly variable.  As can 
be seen from the results shown in Table 4, the coefficient on the VC pay anomaly variable is 
almost identical to the coefficient estimated from Model 3 (0.233 versus 0.241) and, though the 
coefficient on the difference between the two pay benchmarks is positive it is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels of confidence.  On the basis of these results it might be 
concluded that the pay received by other UK CEOs has no incremental explanatory power 
relative to the VC pay anomaly variable.  Nevertheless, Model 5 includes the five university 
performance variables and the constant term, all of which appear not to be statistically related to 
VC pay awards.  The more parsimonious Model 5a, which excludes these irrelevant variables and 
hence focuses solely on evaluating the explanatory power of the three (one internal and two 
external) pay comparison variables, provides results that are consistent with hypothesis H5.  In 
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this more efficient model, the coefficient of 0.065 on the difference between the two external pay 
comparisons is highly significant and, as suggested by H5, is significantly smaller than the 0.233 
estimated coefficient on the VC pay anomaly variable.  
 
The results presented in Table 4 appear to suggest that VC pay awards are determined solely with 
reference to internal and external pay comparisons, but that the impact of the latter may be 
subdued somewhat due to political constraints. Nevertheless, it will be recalled from the 
descriptive statistics shown in Table 1 that the UK university sector includes a wide variety of 
institutions in terms of size, research income, the proportion of highly paid staff and the 
composition of their student intakes.  This cross-sectional heterogeneity implies that individual 
universities have very different business models, academic missions and relative exposures to 
internal and external pay pressures.  For example, the high status, research-intensive, pre-1992 
universities are likely to view increases in research income more favourably than income from 
increased undergraduate numbers even though, given the competition for high quality 
researchers, this is also likely to increase average staff costs.  In order to check the robustness of 
our results and to test the possibility that remuneration committees of the pre-1992 universities 
may be more susceptible to internal and external pay pressures and/or apply very different 
performance criteria in regard to how they remunerate their VCs, in Table 5 we re-estimate 
models 5 and 5a for the two sub-groups of universities, i.e., the research-intensive pre-1992 
universities and the post-1992 institutions.   
 
As can be seen from Table 5, the results for Model 5 for the two groups of universities are 
slightly different, particularly in regard to the size, signs and significance levels of some of the 
university performance measures.  For example, for the pre-1992 universities we now obtain 
significantly positive coefficients in respect of the changes in postgraduate students and for 
changes in research income.  As regards the post-1992 universities, we now obtain a highly 
significant positive coefficient on the change in total student numbers, whilst there is a 
significantly negative coefficient on the change in postgraduate students.  Moreover, for the post-
1992 universities, there appears to be no significantly positive relationship between the change in 
other highly paid staff and VC pay awards.  As can be seen from the “coefficient differences” 
column, the differences between the two groups of universities in terms of total students, 
postgraduates and research income are statistically significant at 5% or better confidence levels.  
The more parsimonious Model 5a results for the two subgroups also shown in Table 5 confirm 
the lack of statistical significance in respect of the internal pay comparison measure for the post-
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1992 universities though, as indicated in the coefficient differences column neither this nor any of 
the remaining coefficient differences are statistically significant.   
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper has empirically examined UK university VC pay awards over the 6 year period to 
2002.  Despite significant differences between the pre-1992 and post-1992 universities in terms 
of total income growth, the growth in other high paid employees, success at attracting research 
income and the proportions of postgraduate and overseas students, for both groups average CV 
pay was approximately £100,000 in 1997.  Consistent with their faster average income growth 
rates, over the subsequent 5 years the pay of the pre-1992 university VC’s increased at a slightly 
faster rate than that of the post-1992 University VCs. By 2002 the pre-1992 university VC’s were 
earning on average £143,400, which was some £10,000 more than their counterparts in the post-
1992 sector. 
 
Nevertheless, average VC pay even in the pre-1992 sector has continued to fall further behind 
that of a far more relevant comparison group, namely, the pay of CEOs of comparable-sized UK 
enterprises.  On the basis of a pay level model calibrated on UK CEO and Datastream listed firm 
data over the same period, UK VCs appear to be significantly underpaid relative to CEOs running 
UK firms that generate similar sales revenues.  VC pay awards are however influenced by both 
internal pay comparisons, i.e., the change in the number of other highly paid staff in their 
institutions, and external pay comparisons since we document a highly significant (partial) 
adjustment to prior period CEO and other VC external labour market pay anomalies. These 
highly significant partial adjustments of VC pay to prior period external labour market pay 
anomalies are robust to (i.e., unaffected by) the inclusion of other performance and University 
specific variables in the estimating equation.  
 
The partial adjustment implied by the small but significantly positive coefficient on the difference 
between the two external pay benchmarks suggests that average VC pay increases have been 
constrained throughout the period.  Given the relatively small sums of money involved, even a 
doubling of VC pay would have little discernable impact on the finances of their universities or 
their ability to increase the pay of other university employees.  Hence, financial constraints are 
clearly not the primary cause of the relatively low VC salaries in the UK. Rather, we have 
interpreted these results as reflecting the desire of remuneration committees to avoid public 
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criticism, particularly from Academic trade unions, regarding awarding pay rises to VCs that in 
percentage terms consistently exceed that of their academic and other professional employees.  
Though the academic trade unions are perhaps correct in claiming that UK academic salaries also 
need to rise, their continued insistence on national pay bargaining appears to be a major 
constraint upon increasing pay levels in the wealthier and more competitive research intensive 
universities.  Indeed, the example of the London Business School, which in the early 1990’s 
broke away from this system of national bargaining, demonstrates as much.  In 2002 more than 
100% of LBS’s full time equivalent academic staff (i.e., even many of its part time staff) earned 
more than £50,000. 
 
The continuing low pay of VCs and the highly intemperate tone of the criticisms of university 
remuneration committees and VCs listed in Figure 1 are, of course, likely to be self-defeating if 
they have the effect of reducing the pool of talented individuals willing to take on the job of VC.  
Perhaps equally serious for the future of UK universities, such criticisms could lead to fewer 
distinguished outsiders being willing to freely give their time to sit on university Councils.  It is 
clear that in an era of increasing international competition and declining State funding, 
universities need and deserve the same high quality leadership and governance skills as any other 
organisation.   We find ourselves in agreement with the sentiments expressed by Oswald 
(reproduced in Figure 1), namely that the criticisms to date of VC pay rises are “inherently 
childish” and that for the future health of the UK university sector, it is imperative that the 
salaries of VCs become “competitive with those paid outside academia.”  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics by Year 
(Standard Deviations in Parenthesis) 
   Year      
Variable Name 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
   
2002 
Number of Observations by Year 
 
Number of Pre-1992 Universities 
Number of Post-1992 Universities 
 
 104 
 
   63 
   41 
 105 
 
   64 
   41 
  107 
 
    65 
    42 
  105 
 
    63 
    42 
  110 
 
    66 
    44 
 110 
 
   66 
   44 
Total Income (£m’s) 
 
 
Mean for Pre-1992 Universities 
Mean for Post-1992 Universities 
 
 94.8 
(59.2)  
   
 110.6 
   69.9 
    
   99.3 
 (65.8)  
  
 116.9 
   72.1 
    
  103.7 
 (71.0)  
   
  123.4 
    73.9 
     
 108.6 
 (80.0)  
   
  131.6 
    74.2 
     
 115.4 
(82.5)  
  
 140.1 
   75.8 
    
 123.9 
(87.3) 
 
 149.6 
   76.5 
    
Total Research Income (£m’s) 
  
 
Mean for Pre-1992 Universities 
Mean for Post-1992 Universities 
 
  13.1 
(20.5)  
   
  20.1 
    2.0 
   
  14.1 
(23.0)  
   
  21.9 
    2.2 
    
  15.2 
(25.1)  
   
  23.7 
    2.3 
    
  16.5 
(26.6)  
   
  25.8 
    2.6 
   
  17.8 
 (29.4)  
   
  27.8 
    2.8 
    
 21.9 
(33.2) 
   
  34.2 
    2.9 
    
Total (FTE) Staff (Academic, 
Academic-related and Administrative) 
  
Mean for Pre-1992 Universities 
Mean for Post-1992 Universities 
 
 887.6 
 (611.7)  
 
1009.7 
  695.4 
 889.9 
(619.3)  
 
1019.0 
  693.2 
     
  917.8 
 (640.6)  
 
1042.9 
  728.8 
     
  974.7 
(737.5) 
 
1119.7 
  757.3 
     
 968.2 
(758.8)  
 
1127.0 
  730.0 
     
 1058.0 
 (782.2) 
 
1255.4 
  752.7 
     
Nationally Agreed Pay Level for point 
18 Lecturer B scale (pre-1992 
Universities) (£’s) 
27,985 28,454 30,036 30,967 31,896 32,537 
Number of Staff Earning >£50,000 
 
  
Mean for Pre-1992 Universities 
Mean for Post-1992 Universities 
 
  34.4 
 (51.2) 
 
 53.1 
   6.7 
40.9 
(58.0) 
 
61.1 
  9.1 
48.6 
(65.8) 
 
71.0 
14.1 
62.2 
(74.8) 
 
91.3 
18.6 
 
73.1 
(85.2) 
 
106.2 
 23.4 
 
88.0 
(98.9) 
 
125.5 
 31.2 
 
Number of Staff Earning >£100,000 
 
 
Mean for Pre-1992 Universities 
Mean for Post-1992 Universities 
 
  2.3 
(4.8) 
 
 3.7 
 0.1 
 
 4.6 
(10.4) 
 
 7.5 
 0.2 
 
 5.8 
(12.8) 
 
 9.5 
 0.3 
 
 6.1 
(13.9) 
 
 10.0 
 0.2 
 
 7.7 
(16.1) 
 
12.6 
 0.4 
  
Total (FTE) Students (000’s) 
 
 
Mean for Pre-1992 Universities 
Mean for Post-1992 Universities 
 
 
 11.4 
(7.8) 
 
  11.3 
  12.4 
   
12.0 
(8.0) 
 
  11.6 
  12.6 
    
12.1 
(8.4) 
 
  11.8 
  12.7 
    
12.2 
(8.6) 
 
  12.0 
  12.5 
   
13.1 
(8.2) 
 
  12.4 
  14.2 
   
13.7 
(8.7) 
 
  13.2 
  14.6 
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Percentage of Post Graduate Students 
 
 
Mean for Pre-1992 Universities 
Mean for Post-1992 Universities 
 
21.8 
(17.4) 
 
27.7 
11.9 
 
21.9 
(17.2) 
 
27.8 
12.5 
 
22.1 
(17.3) 
 
28.2 
12.7 
 
22.3 
(17.3) 
 
28.3 
13.42 
23.2 
(17.0) 
 
29.3 
14.0 
 
23.5 
(17.2) 
 
29.6 
14.3 
 
Percentage of Overseas (non-UK/EU) 
Students 
 
Mean for Pre-1992 Universities 
Mean for Post-1992 Universities 
 
17.4 
(12.8) 
 
21.0 
11.1 
17.8 
(11.9) 
 
21.3 
12.3 
18.0 
(12.2) 
 
22.0 
11.9 
 
18.2 
(12.0) 
 
21.7 
12.9 
 
17.7 
(11.9) 
 
21.0 
12.6 
 
18.0 
(12.3) 
 
21.5 
12.6 
 
Vice Chancellor ‘s Remuneration 
(£000’s) 
 
Mean for Pre-1992 Universities 
Mean for Post-1992 Universities 
 
 100.2 
 (15.9) 
 
  100.5 
    99.9 
     
  111.5 
  (17.8)  
 
  114.6 
  106.5 
     
  116.9 
  (20.8)  
 
  121.4 
  110.0 
     
 123.4 
(22.0)  
 
  127.9 
  116.7 
     
 135.7 
 (34.6) 
 
  141.9 
  126.3 
     
  139.5 
  (27.0) 
 
  143.4 
  133.7 
     
Datastream Predicted Average t-1 Vice 
Chancellor’s Pay (£000’s)  
  
Mean for Pre-1992 Universities 
Mean for Post-1992 Universities 
 
203.5 
(27.9) 
 
 210.2 
 193.0 
   
257.3 
(36.6) 
 
  266.2 
  243.6 
     
272.8 
(38.3) 
 
  282.8 
  257.7 
     
305.2 
(44.8) 
 
317.0 
287.3 
    
319.6 
(48.3) 
 
  331.7 
  301.3 
     
342.7 
(52.8) 
 
  356.9 
  321.2 
     
Average t-1 CEO Pay (£000’s) 
(for Datastream Companies <£1billion 
Sales) 
  N= 
 
 283.0 
(187.2) 
 
 384 
 296.7 
(195.0)  
 
  408 
 315.7 
(212.8) 
 
 314 
 
 330.8 
(260.4) 
 
 488 
 377.6 
(293.4) 
 
 405 
 403.4 
(315.7) 
 
 412 
Total  t-1 Sales (£1millions) 
(for Datastream Companies <£1billion 
Sales) 
  N= 
 
 200.2 
(219.3) 
 
 384 
 203.5 
(216.5) 
 
 408 
226.9 
(221.3) 
 
 314 
 199.6 
(208.6) 
 
 488 
  216.9 
(223.1) 
 
 405 
  219.7 
(257.6) 
 
 412 
 
Notes:  
The University pay and performance data relates to all UK higher education institutions with 
annual turnover in excess of £20million for which we obtained the three consecutive years of data 
required to estimate the pay change models presented in Tables 4 and 5. 
The university performance data was obtained from the Higher Education Statistical Service 
(HESA) Year Books and the VC pay information was obtained from the THES and, in a few 
cases, from the published Financial Statements of individual universities. 
For comparison purposes and for estimating the external CEO market pay anomaly variable, 
comparable pay and performance data relating to UK firms on the Datastream database was 
obtained.  The Datastream variables above and the CEO pay level model shown in Table 3 was 
estimated using a total of 3258 firm-years over the period 1995 to 2001, which includes all CEOs 
of other UK listed non-financial firms with at least 100 full-time equivalent employees, a 
turnover between £20 million and £1billion per annum and which had a minimum of 2 years of 
complete data required to estimate the CEO pay level model.  
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Table 2 
Correlation Matrix 
 
Section A: Pay Level and Performance Variables 
1. Ln(W)t 
 
1.00         
2. Ln(WCEO)t 
 
0.67 1.00        
3. Ln(WVC)t 
 
0.71 0.94 1.00       
4. Ln(Total Sales) t-1 
 
0.43 0.71 0.61 1.00      
5. Ln (Staff earning >£50k)t 0.66 0.80 0.93 0.43 1.00      
6. Ln (PG Students) t-1 0.25 0.46 0.41 0.64 0.28 1.00     
7. Ln (Research income)t-1 0.23 0.42 0.41 0.57 0.34 0.50 1.00    
8. Ln(non-UK/EU students)t-1 0.10 0.24 0.22 0.34 0.16 0.52 0.29 1.00   
9. Ln(Total FTE Students)t-1 0.18 0.32 0.24 0.46 0.12 0.71 0.12 0.47 1.00  
10. Type of University 
(pre-1992 =1) 
0.11 0.18 0.22 0.27 0.23 0.33 0.55 0.09 -0.13 1.00 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Section B: Pay Change and Performance Variables 
1. Ln(W)t+1 - Ln(W)t 
 
1.00          
2. Ln(WCEO)t - Ln(W)t
 
0.33 1.00         
3. Ln(WVC)t - Ln(W)t 
 
0.35 0.79 1.00        
4. Ln(WCEO)t - Ln(WVC)t
 
0.09 0.62 0.00 1.00       
5. change in VCt+1
 
-0.23 -0.10 -0.08 -0.-6 1.00      
6. Ln∆(Total Sales) t -0.06 -0.13 -0.07 -0.11 -0.02 1.00      
7. Ln ∆ (Staff earning >£50k)t 0.22 0.14 -0.04 0.28 -0.08 -0.08 1.00     
8. Ln ∆ (PG Students) t -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.07 0.01 0.06 -0.03 1.00    
9. Ln ∆ (Research income)t -0.00 -0.02 -0.06 0.04 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 1.00   
10. Ln∆ (non-UK/EU 
students)t
-0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 0.04 0.06 -0.05 0.73 0.02 1.00  
11. Ln∆ (Total FTE Students)t -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.75 0.02 0.69 1.00 
12. Type of University 
(pre-1992 =1) 
0.05 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.13 0.09 0.12 0.06 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
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TABLE 3 
ESTIMATION OF CEO and VC PAY LEVELS  1997 TO 2002 
 
Dependent Variable =Ln(W)t,  
where Wt = VC or Datastream CEO Total Cash (salary plus bonuses) Pay in time t 
 
Independent Variable 
 
Datastream 
Pay Level 
Model 1 
VC Pay 
Model 1 
(all 
Universities)   
VC Pay 
Model 1 
(excl 
outliers) 
VC Pay 
Model 2 
 
VC Pay Model 2 
(Random Effects 
Estimates) 
Constant 
 
    2.577 
 (32.66)*** 
   3.462 
 (23.46)*** 
   3.050 
 (24.08)*** 
   3.625 
 (19.73)*** 
   3.485 
 (15.42)*** 
Year Dummy 1998 
 
   0.223 
  (7.85)*** 
   0.039 
  (1.84)* 
   0.036 
  (1.76)* 
   0.038 
  (1.89)* 
   0.039 
  (3.17)*** 
Year Dummy 1999  
 
   0.271 
  (9.85)*** 
   0.142 
  (6.88)*** 
   0.136 
  (7.11)*** 
   0.003 
  (0.09) 
   0.073 
  (3.35)*** 
Year Dummy 2000 
 
  0.372 
 (12.89)*** 
  0.185 
 (8.58)*** 
  0.175 
 (9.10)*** 
  0.031 
 (0.99) 
  0.107 
 (4.61)*** 
Year Dummy 2001 
 
   0.411 
  (16.25)*** 
   0.235 
 (11.24)*** 
   0.225 
 (12.05)*** 
   0.069 
 (2.09)** 
   0.151 
 (6.12)*** 
Year Dummy 2002 
 
   0.468 
  (21.37)*** 
   0.314 
 (13.19)*** 
   0.302 
 (14.07)*** 
   0.127 
 (3.62)*** 
   0.212 
 (8.18)*** 
Log(Total Sales) t-1 
 
    0.244 
  (38.61)*** 
    0.097 
  (7.50)*** 
    0.134 
 (12.13)*** 
    0.091 
  (4.81)*** 
    0.099 
  (4.23)*** 
Sector-relative Shareholder 
Returnst
   0.002 
   (0.22)  
                
Ln(Staff earning >£50k)t      0.047 
 (5.86)*** 
  0.023 
 (3.70)*** 
Ln (PG Students) t-1     -0.018 
 (1.38) 
  0.005 
 (0.32) 
Ln (Research income)t-1     -0.006 
 (1.06) 
 -0.005 
 (0.91) 
Ln(non-UK/EU students)t-1     -0.009 
 (1.29) 
 -0.013 
 (1.99)** 
Log(Total FTE Students)t-1      0.016 
  (1.46) 
  0.006 
  (0.59) 
Wald Test for New 
Variables (d.o.f.) 
     22.00*** 
  (5) 
   
Adjusted R2 
 
    33.5%     38.8%     47.8%     50.5%     50.5% 
Equation F-Ratio 
 (d.o.f.) 
 
   235.11*** 
 (7,3246) 
    67.85*** 
  (6,634) 
   81.57*** 
  (6,616) 
  58.45*** 
  (11,611) 
  58.45*** 
  (11,611) 
Number of Observations   3254      641      623      623      623 
 
Notes: 
With the exception of the Random Effects Model, White’s (1980) heterskedastic adjusted t-values (shown in parenthesis) have 
been used.     
Significance levels * ≤ 0.10; ** ≤ 0.05    *** ≤ 0.01 
The Datastream model was estimated using all UK listed non-financial firms with annual turnover between  £20million and 
£1billion. 
TABLE  4 
ESTIMATION OF UK UNIVERSITY VC PAY CHANGES: 1997 TO 2002 
Dependent Variable  =  Ln(W)t+1 - Ln(W)t
 
Independent Variable  Model 2 
 
 Model 3 
 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 5a 
 
Constant 
 
 
   0.065*** 
  (12.35) 
   0.061*** 
  (9.31) 
   0.067*** 
 (10.14)  
   0.045 
   (1.33) 
 
Change  in VC Dummyt 
 
 
 -0.055*** 
 (2.59) 
 -0.047*** 
 (3.38) 
 -0.048*** 
 (3.34) 
 -0.047*** 
 (3.35) 
 -0.046*** 
 (3.33) 
Ln∆(Total Sales)t 
 
 
- 0.069 
  (1.11) 
- 0.028 
  (0.46) 
- 0.014 
  (0.22) 
- 0.025 
  (0.41) 
 
Ln∆(Staff >£50k)t
 
 
  0.015*** 
  (4.05) 
  0.017*** 
  (4.89) 
  0.012*** 
  (3.52) 
  0.016*** 
  (4.26) 
  0.015*** 
  (4.45) 
Ln∆(Total Students)t
 
 
 -0.008 
 (0.25) 
 -0.002 
 (0.08) 
 -0.006 
 (0.22) 
 -0.002 
 (0.09) 
 
Ln∆(Post-Grad Students)t
 
 
  0.010 
 (0.36) 
  0.005 
 (0.24) 
 -0.003 
 (0.15) 
  0.004 
 (0.19) 
 
Ln∆( non-UK/EU students)t
 
 
 -0.004 
 (0.27) 
 -0.001 
 (0.08) 
 -0.004 
 (0.29) 
 -0.000 
 (0.03) 
 
Ln∆(Research income)t
 
 -0.003 
 (0.48) 
  0.002 
 (0.34) 
 -0.001 
 (0.20) 
  0.002 
 (0.32) 
 
(LnWVCit – LnWit) 
 
 
  0.241*** 
(4.46) 
  0.233*** 
(7.55) 
  0.233*** 
 (7.46) 
(LnWVCit – LnWit) > 0 
 
 
 -0.015 
(0.17) 
    
(LnWCEOit – LnWit) 
 
 
     0.155*** 
 (6.50) 
   
(LnWCEOit – LnWVCit) 
 
     0.017 
(0.46) 
 
  0.065*** 
 (16.43) 
Adjusted R2 
 
   8.3%   19.4%   16.1%   19.4%   19.4% 
Equation F-Ratio 
(d.o.f.) 
 
   9.06*** 
   (7,615) 
  17.64*** 
(9,613) 
  15.90*** 
   (8,614) 
  17.68*** 
 (9,613) 
  52.61*** 
   (3,619) 
Wald Test for 
additional/removed Variables 
(d.o.f.) 
      
 10.06*** 
   (2) 
  
 11.92*** 
    (1) 
    
  
 10.76*** 
   (2) 
 
   2.21 
    (6) 
    
Number of Observations    623    623    623    623    623 
Notes:  White’s (1980) heterskedastic adjusted t-values (shown in parenthesis) used. 
             significance levels * ≤ 0.10;  **  ≤ 0.05    *** ≤ 0.01 
             With the exception of Model 5a, where it refers to the number of variables removed relative to Model 5,   
              the Wald Test is a χ2 statistic with k d.o.f., where k = number of new variables relative to Model 2.  
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TABLE  5 
ESTIMATION OF VC PAY CHANGES BY TYPE OF UNIVERSITY 
Dependent Variable  =  Ln(W)t+1 - Ln(W)t
 
Independent Variable  Model 5 
Pre-1992 
 Model 5 
Post-1992 
Coefficient 
Differences 
 Model 5a 
Pre-1992 
 Model 5a 
Post-1992 
Coefficient 
Differences 
Constant 
 
 
   0.057 
   (1.22) 
   0.024 
   (0.58) 
   0.033 
  (0.53) 
   
Change  in VC Dummyt 
 
 
 -0.042** 
 (2.33) 
 -0.060*** 
 (2.73) 
  0.018 
 (0.53) 
 -0.042** 
 (2.40) 
 -0.056*** 
 (2.50) 
  0.015 
 (0.51) 
Ln∆(Total Sales)t 
 
 
- 0.048 
  (0.69) 
  0.027 
  (0.25) 
- 0.075 
  (0.59) 
   
Ln∆(Staff >£50k)t
 
 
  0.019*** 
  (4.04) 
  0.009 
  (1.37) 
  0.010 
  (1.31) 
  0.017*** 
  (4.39) 
  0.007 
  (1.13) 
  0.010 
  (1.42) 
Ln∆(Total Students)t
 
 
 -0.041 
 (0.92) 
  0.091*** 
 (2.48) 
 -0.131** 
 (2.29) 
   
Ln∆(Post-Grad Students)t
 
 
  0.056* 
 (1.83) 
 -0.089*** 
 (2.99) 
  0.145*** 
 (3.40) 
   
Ln∆( non-UK/EU students)t
 
 
 -0.007 
 (0.36) 
 -0.015 
 (0.62) 
  0.008 
 (0.27) 
   
Ln∆(Research income)t
 
 
  0.026** 
 (1.95) 
 -0.005 
 (1.06) 
  0.032** 
 (2.20) 
   
(LnWVCit – LnWit) 
 
 
 0.224*** 
(6.06) 
 0.255*** 
(5.30) 
-0.031 
(0.51) 
  0.221*** 
 (5.68) 
  0.258*** 
 (5.17) 
 -0.037 
 (0.59) 
(LnWCEOit – LnWVCit) 
 
 0.002 
(0.03) 
 
 0.047 
(1.02) 
 
  -0.045 
  (0.64) 
  0.065*** 
 (13.11) 
  0.069*** 
  (9.96) 
 -0.004 
 (0.47) 
Adjusted R2 
 
  21.5%   18.6%   20.6%   21.0%   17.4%   19.9% 
Equation F-Ratio 
(d.o.f.) 
 
  12.18*** 
 (9,359) 
   7.43*** 
 (9,244) 
   9.48*** 
(19,603) 
  33.69*** 
   (3,365) 
  18.75*** 
   (3,250) 
  23.08*** 
  (7,615) 
Wald Test for 
additional/removed Variables 
(d.o.f.) 
  
 
  
  
  
 18.73** 
  (10) 
 
   8.23 
    (6) 
    
 
   9.77 
    (6) 
    
 
  3.73 
   (4) 
Number of Observations    369    254    623    369    254   623 
Notes: White’s (1980) heterskedastic adjusted t-values (shown in parenthesis) used. 
            significance levels * ≤ 0.10;  **  ≤ 0.05    *** ≤ 0.00. 
            The Wald Test statistics in the coefficient differences columns refer to the statistical significance of the k   
             interaction terms added to the Table 4 estimates of models 5 and 5a.     
            The Wald Test statistics  in the Pre and post 1992 Model 5a columns refer to the statistical significance  
             of the k variables removed relative to Model 5 in the current table.  
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Figure One 
Reactions in the Times Higher Educational Supplement (THES) to the publication of Vice 
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Endnotes 
 
                                          
 VC to refer to 1 In the paper we use the term the executive head of the institution, even though in 
so ses the post had an alternative title such as Principal (e.g., the Scottish Universities) or 
Di .g., specialist colleges and institutes).  
 
2 I rth stres e governanc
Greenbury, 199  sugges
ought to control or attempt to hold down executive pay. 
 
3 E or to was
rem on c ero
we rgely re ndat
consultants” re tes and t
related pay sch  and Forb
the evidence). 
 
4 Whilst the water company remuneration committees did aw
their CEOs in the early post-privatisation period, because pr
particularly low, even af ater com
much lower tha ized UK
 
5 Regulatory pr rather th
executive pay i
 
6 The Universi 92 Univ
the post-1992 institutions is generally  governors”. 
 
pical increase in pay experienced 
ff not currently at the top of a scale, 
there is an automatic progression each year up the pay scale.  Even for staff at the top of a scale 
there is the possibility of being awarded additional “discretionary” increments and/or being 
internally promoted to a higher grade.   
 
9 Though we produce some pay level estimates in Table 3, it is worth stressing that the focus of 
our analysis is the determinants of VC pay awards (changes).  For the reasons stated in the text, 
we do not attempt to estimate a complete model of VC pay levels as has been attempted 
previously by Bainbridge and Simpson (1996) or Dolton and Ma (2003). 
 
10 As can be seen from the correlation matrix shown in Table 2, the various University 
characteristics are all highly correlated.  However, the first-differences, i.e., changes, of these 
variables are, as can be seen from section B of Table 2, very much less highly correlated with 
each other. 
 
11 We also estimated all of the models excluding cases where there had been a change in VC. The 
results were statistically indistinguishable from the results presented in the paper. 
me ca
rector (e
t is wo sing that none of the UK corporat
5; Hampel, 1998; Higgs, 2003) have
 their widespread introduction in 1993, it 
ommittees tended to award relatively gen
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emes (see Main and Johnson, 1993
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 apparent that firms with 
us pay increases to their CEOs and 
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ice controls ensure that shareholders 
ncreases. 
ty Council is the title used by the pre-19
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ersities.  The governing body of 
 
7 This model (Model 1, shown in Table 3) is discussed in the following section. 
 
8 The percentage increase in pay scale rates highlighted by the Association of University
Teachers (AUT), is actually a significant underestimate of the ty
by staff in post throughout the period.  This is because, for sta
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